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use RFID; the domestic government research units pay a special attention to this area, so under the support of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Taipei Computer Association of "RFID industrial Association for the 
Promotion of the establishment of the General Assembly” has been setup, the first president Frank Huang 
served as chairman of the Taipei Computer Association"[16], he leads all manufactures to include the RFID 
operation. Therefore RFID has a special effect on businesses in the world. Some many areas such as materials 
management, health care, access control systems, telemedicine, or other usages using RFID are provided. 
Based on the use of RFID and transfer information transmitted in the air must have additional security 
problems, such as eavesdropping, interception, tampering or resend, some attacks are found in the problems 
of security and privacy, according to Yehet al. protocol and our research from the collected papers 
[5,9,10,13,14],some security issues are as follows: 
(1) Information Leakage: an attacker illegally unauthorized reader to read the tag or the interception of 
several messages related confidential information. 
(2) Replay attack: the attacker transfersthe information obtained by eavesdropping, then, with illegally 
sending, the counterfeit legitimate device has to pass the authorization. 
(3) Tracking attack: a tag can be sent by their label; an attacker can track the location area and find its 
purpose. 
(4) Forward secrecy attack: an attacker can crack the tag memory information, to identified with the 
purpose, then identifies the past transaction records. 
(5) Denial of service attack (QoS): RFID transmits large amounts of information in order to block, obstruct 
or intercept,QoScan stop the communications between tags and back-end server. 
(6) Impersonation attack: the attacker can be a pseudo-legal device to complete the authentication. 
The communication ways of RFID can be divided into two kinds of electromagnetic induction and 
microwave resonance [12].There are also three kinds of active RFID, semi-active RFID and passive RFID 
according the battery support. 
2. Relative paper review and Discussion 
There are many papers talking the RFID with their related topics, within their way, the Yehet al. protocol 
derived from Kimet al. protocol is found. So this research wants to deeply understand why the reasons of 
Yehet al. protocol came from Kim et al. protocol, and to discuss what the disadvantages of Yeh et al. 
protocol. 
2.1 Discussion of EPC Global Class-1 Gen-2 RFID 
There are many papers have talked about the EPC Global Class-1 Gen-2 RFID, and explain their 
disadvantages. Tao and Li [11] discussed the relative collisions of RFID in the transmission process, an 
anti-collision algorithm to solve these problems by the two authors. Shamir [6] also proposed flanking attack 
(side channel attack) to obtain information from the internal key to open other functions; it is also worth to 
consider a weakness. Mitrokotsaet al. [8] also proposed some RFID attacks, thisis to setup a table to illustrate 
many attacks, by idea of Mitrokotsaet al. [8],this research can provide information on how to think, and put 
forward the corresponding practice. 
2.2 Kimet al. Protocol and disadvantage 
Due to the limited computing functions,low-cost Class-1 Gen-2 RFID tags cannot be carried out complex 
computations, so there is a security problem. Kim et al. [3] proposed to improve the protocol in Figure 
1,thekey shared by the back-end serverandtag to process the mutual authentication, and protects the 
transmission of data using the pseudo-random number. The protocol assumes a security zone between reader 
and tag, but DMZ (de-military zone) areais between reader and back-end server. The notations are listed in 
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Table 1according to Chien and Chen [4]. 
Table 1 Notations 
Notation Explanation 
 XOR 
+ Add operator 
|| Concatenation 
f(.) Random number generator 
RT32 Random generator by tag 
S Share key between back-end server and tag 
EPC Electronic product code 
PC Reader can get some EPC from tag in physical protocol control message 
CRC16 Cyclic redundancy code 16 
PIN Passwordcan be either PIN1 or PIN2 
PIN1 Access password is between back-end server and tag, the purpose is to get tag. 
PIN2 Kill Password is between back-end server and tag, the purpose is to destroy tag. 
 
But according to Yeh et al., they support some disadvantages from Kim et al. protocol as the following: 
(1)Replay attack: because RR32 is a plaintext, PIN1 and PIN2 are fixed integers,Deursen and Radomirovi
[7] found that the first eavesdropping attack can find the normal communication between the tag and reader. 
i.e., From Figure 2, an attack sends a random query to the tag, and provides M1’=RT3’ PIN1, according to 
pre-eavesdropping message of M1 and RR32, Kim et al. protocol want to compute: 
RR32’ = RR32 M1 M1’ 
= RR32 (RT32 PIN1) (RT32’ PIN1) 
=RR32 RT32 RT32’ 
Ifback-end server receives as: 
M2'=RR32’ PIN2 RT32' 
=(RR32 RT32 RT32’) PIN2 RT32  
= RR32 PIN2 RT32’ 
If the back-end server eavesdrops the normal communication and find M2' is equal to M2 valuefrom the 
tag, but P isderived M3 = f (M2) and PIN (access or destroy tags as to the requirement of commands). If the 
attacker tapping into P of Step 9 in Figure 1, the tagcan be adopted and the tag can be accessed or stopped its 
function. 
(2) Forward security attack: this research finds that if an attacker wants to destroy the memory information 
individually and substituted into the past records in the database and then does the algorithm, you can identify 
the records of the relative value of the tag. So value M1 in past record in Step 2 in Figure 1 has to 
transmit.ThenM1 PIN1=RT32'; the RR32 in Step 3 in Figure 1 with PIN2 to compute M2'=RR32 PIN2
RT32 . The next calculation isM3' = f (M2') and T'(0 RT32' M2' M3' which the last bit is cancelled), 
and to the in-sided memory S to calculate E' = (T'+ S) EPC', if E' and E derived in Step 4 is equal, the 
protocol can confirm that the sending record is relative to the tag. 
(3) QoS: after p is sent to open the access permission in this protocol, interception or tampering by an 
attacker sendsto update Write commandof PIN1, the update does not make the tagwith the back-end server 
synchronized, so that the tagcannot be through the identification of the back-end server. 
2.3 Yehet al. protocol and their disadvantage 
Yehet al.protocol[14] want to update the information weaknessin the RFID protocol by Kim et al. shown 
in Figure 1, the pseudo-random number RR32 Kim et al. sent in plaintext can trigger the replay attack;in 
addition, there are not copies of the values in both readers and tags, the forward security attackcan 
appear.Therefore Yehet al. protocol want to use a pseudo-pseudo-random number RID to protect RR32 in 
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(4) Tag  Reader: PC, E, CRC16. If the tag gets the M1 which is equal to M1 in Step 2, tag will compute 
M2= Si PIN1i RT32, M3=f(M2), the T is the 0||M1||M2||M3 with the last bit is cancelled again. Ei = 
T EPCi. All items of Ei, PC and CRC1 are sent to reader. 
(5) Reader  Back-end Server:Ei, M1. The reader sends Eiand M1 to back-end server. 
(6) Back-end server Reader: Information. If the back-end server gets the M1 and compare to the record in 
their server, the equation of RT32’= M1 f(PIN1i* PIN2i); M2’=Si PIN1i* RT32’; M3’= f(M2’); 
PIN1i*can be a PIN1i_new or PIN1i_old. T’ is 0||M1’||M2’||M3’with last bit is cancelled; Ei’ = T’ EPCi. If Ei’ 
is the same as Ei, then the tag can be the same in back-end server, the information is transferred to tag. 
(7) Reader Back-end server: PIN request. Reader sends a requestto back-end server to know that the tag 
can be accessed or destroyed. 
(8) Back-end server Reader: P. Back-end server can derive P to reader where P=f(PIN M3’), PINcan be 
PIN1i* or PIN2i, then the content of PIN1i is updated. 
PIN1i_old PIN1i* 
PIN1i_new RT32 PIN1i*’ 
(9) Reader Tag: P. Reader sends tag with P and let tag to compute P’. P’= f(PIN  M3), PIN can be 
PIN1ior PIN2i. If PIN=PIN1i, P’ is the same with Pfrom reader, the authentication of back-end server is 
allowed, the access authorization can be pass for tag. Otherwise, PIN=PIN2i, P’ is the same as Pin reader, all 
functions of that tag are stop after the authentication from back-end server, the content of PIN1i is updated. 
4.Comparison of Security analysis and performance evaluation 
The security analysis of a new protocol is described and the comparison is shown in Table 2: 
Table 2 Security analysis 
 Kim et al. protocol Yehet al. protocol This research 
Information leakage    
Replay attack    
Track attack    
Forward attack    
Counterfeit attack    
QoS    
 
(1) Information leak: an eavesdropper can obtain E and M1,nevertheless, all protected messages must be 
transmittedvia PIN1i, PIN2iandrecent value of RID, the eavesdropper cannot obtain the information in order 
to prevent the leakage of information 
(2) Replay attack: in this research, Siprevents the RIDtobe stolen;PIN1ivalue is updated after the back-end 
server and tags is updated. The various values of PIN1iare provided and then to prevent replay attacks. 
(3) Tracking attack: the tag sendall informationusing variouspseudo-random number, so illegal attacker 
cannot trace a tag holder by the predictive value. 
(4) Forward security attack: each time the tag updatesPIN1icontinuously, the communications with 
different PIN1iand RIDcan protect the information randomly, so an attacker cannot crack information in tag 
and some records in back-end serverin order to identify with some information about that tag. 
(5) DoS attack: the back-end server keeps old and new values of PIN1i, when interception or tampering 
happen,the back-end server system can usethe old value of PIN1i to identify; the back-end server and tag can 
meet asynchronouslyDoS attack. 
116   Hardy Lin et al. /  IERI Procedia  4 ( 2013 )  110 – 117 
(6) Impersonation attack: the PIN1iand PIN2ican be identified at the same time, the transformation of 
message is also protectedbytheRID;he attacker cannot obtain confidential information shared key to 
counterfeit legitimate senders. 
Table 3 Performance analysis 
Comparison of performance analysis 
 Kimet al. protocol Yehet al. protocol This research 
Tag 
5 XOR 
1 PRNG 
1 Addition mod 2m 
6 XOR 
4 PRNG 
2 Addition mod 2m 
7 XOR 
3 PRNG 
0  
Time complexity O(n) O(n) O(1) 
Embedded Information 
in tag 
Gen-2embedded information 
EPC: 96bits; PIN1: 32bits; PIN2: 32bitsTID: 32bits, sum is 192 bits 
S:96bit, total sum is 
288bits. 
RID:32bit, total sum 
is224bits. 
S:32bits, total sum is 
224bits 
 
Performance evaluation of this research is listed in Table 3 where one PRGN and time complexity of O(1) 
are listed. The combination of Kim et al. protocol and Yehet al. protocol isto develop the new RFID protocol; 
this researchshould be a revised protocol to reduce the extra requirements. 
5. Conclusion 
For the security requirement, following Yehet al. modifies Kim et al. protocol discussed before, Kim et al. 
protocol and Yehet al.protocol have disadvantages found at all, the new protocol derived by his research.This 
research includes the use of shared key S between back-end server systems andtag, the application is to 
release burden for reader generatingRID, so that the reader does not computeany functions and just for 
transmission only.This research would be more secure when the inclusion of Kim et al. and Yehet al. 
protocols to find the particular functions. This research can be practical for general applications;even the 
reduction of search time complexity can make the back-end server system to release the burden. 
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